Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory by Stanley B. Klein
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 01 February 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00003
Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to
operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content
stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory
Stanley B. Klein*
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA
Edited by:
Hans J. Markowitsch, University of
Bielefeld, Germany
Reviewed by:
Robert E. Clark, University Of




Stanley B. Klein, Department of
Psychological and Brain Sciences,
University of California, Santa
Barbara, 551 Ucen Road, Santa
Barbara, CA 93106, USA.
e-mail: klein@psych.ucsb.edu
Episodic memory often is conceptualized as a uniquely human system of long-term
memory that makes available knowledge accompanied by the temporal and spatial context
in which that knowledge was acquired. Retrieval from episodic memory entails a form
of first–person subjectivity called autonoetic consciousness that provides a sense that
a recollection was something that took place in the experiencer’s personal past. In
this paper I expand on this definition of episodic memory. Specifically, I suggest that
(1) the core features assumed unique to episodic memory are shared by semantic
memory, (2) episodic memory cannot be fully understood unless one appreciates that
episodic recollection requires the coordinated function of a number of distinct, yet
interacting, “enabling” systems. Although these systems—ownership, self, subjective
temporality, and agency—are not traditionally viewed as memorial in nature, each is
necessary for episodic recollection and jointly they may be sufficient, and (3) the type
of subjective awareness provided by episodic recollection (autonoetic) is relational rather
than intrinsic—i.e., it can be lost in certain patient populations, thus rendering episodic
memory content indistinguishable from the content of semantic long-term memory.
Keywords: episodic memory, semantic memory, autonoetic awarness, amnesia, self, consciousness
What is episodic memory? As initially conceptualized, it is a sys-
tem of long-termmemory whose content provided its owner with
a record of the temporal, spatial and self-referential features of the
context in which the original learning transpired (e.g., Tulving,
1972, 1983). By contrast, semantic long-term memory lacked
these features: Its offerings were experienced as knowledge devoid
of the contextual elements in which it was acquired.
A clear implication of this distinction was the difference in
subjective relations these systems of memory shared with the past.
Episodic memory entailed awareness that a current recollection
referred directly to, and thus was conceptualized as, an event
that had transpired previously in one’s life. By contrast, content
from semantic memory was solely occurrent—it was present to
awareness—as either thought or image—and though one could
logically infer that the occurrent content must have been acquired
at some time in one’s past, the recollection of its acquisition was
not part of its experienced presentation.
These temporal distinctions were fully appreciated by Tulving,
and in 1985 he made them an explicit basis for distinguish-
ing between episodic and semantic systems of memory (Tulving,
1985). Adopting terminology proposed originally by Husserl—
“noesis” (i.e., the type of experience associated with thought and
remembering; e.g., Husserl, 1964)—Tulving focused attention on
the types temporal subjectivity accompanying the retrieval of
episodic and semantic memory. Episodic memory was held to
enable autonoetic awareness, while semantic memory enabled a
type of awareness he termed noetic (e.g., Tulving, 1985, 1993,
2002; Wheeler et al., 1997; Szpunar and Tulving, 2011).
Autonoetic awareness was defined as “self-knowing”: when
autonoetically aware, the individual’s phenomenology is charac-
terized by “. . . a unique awareness of re-experiencing here and
now something that happened before, at another time and in
another place” (Tulving, 1993, p. 68). By contrast, noetic aware-
ness occurs when one thinks objectively about something one
knows. Individuals are said to be noetically aware when “they
retrieve general information in the absence of a feeling of re-
experiencing the past” (Szpunar, 2010, p. 144). Central to the
proposed distinction: “Only ‘autonoetic consciousness’ is thought
to bear a personally meaningful relation to time” (Szpunar and
Tulving, 2011, p. 4).
Autnoetic and noetic awareness align naturally with episodic
and semantic modes of remembering, respectively (Tulving, 1985,
1993, 2002; Wheeler et al., 1997). Only autonoetic experience
is assumed capable of providing the subjective requirements
for mental time travel (e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997,
2007; Wheeler et al., 1997; Tulving, 2002; but see Klein, 2013b).
Accordingly, episodic memory is tied directly to temporally-rich
autonoetic experience. By contrast, awareness of semantic knowl-
edge (i.e., noetic) lacks a subjective sense that one is mentally
traveling to back in time to the events and experiences in one’s
past that gave birth to that awareness.
Tulving’s reformulation of episodic and semantic memory
in terms of temporal subjectivity has been widely adopted by
memory researchers and has shown to be a particularly fruit-
ful way of generating testable hypotheses and theoretical models
of the episodic and semantic division of long-term declarative
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memory (e.g., Perner and Ruffman, 1994; Gardiner, 2001; Piolino
et al., 2003; Wheeler, 2005; Markowitsch and Staniliou, 2011; for
reviews, see Wheeler et al., 1997; Dere et al., 2008). A distinction
based on subjective temporality also avoids a number of untidy
findings that, over the years, have chipped away at the traditional
classification of episodic and semantic memory in terms of the
presence or absence of the criteria of time, space and self.
For instance, the assumption that episodic, rather than seman-
tic, memory entails a self-referential component has given way
to the well-recognized fact that knowledge in semantic memory
also can be self-referential (for reviews, see Klein, 2010; Klein
and Gangi, 2010; Klein and Lax, 2010; Renoult et al., in press).
In addition, the content of semantic memory is capable of con-
tributing to a knowledge-based representation that includes both
spatial and temporal contextual information (e.g., “I know that
John Lennon was born on October 9th, 1940 in Liverpool, UK,
although I do not recollect the event in which that knowledge was
acquired”; e.g., Tulving et al., 1988; Kopelman et al., 1989; Klein,
2001; for recent reviews see Klein, 2004; Klein and Gangi, 2010;
Klein and Lax, 2010; Martinelli et al., 2012).
Thus, the core constituents of episodic memory as initially
proposed (i.e., temporal, spatial, and self-referential) also can be
on display in semantic memory experience. Indeed, there appears
no principled reason why the content of these two systems should
differ. This is demonstrated rather dramatically in a case pre-
sented by Stuss and Guzman (1988). An individual, who, as a
result of illness, suffered profound retrograde episodic amnesia,
nonetheless was able to successfully re-learn specific temporal and
spatial details of his personal past. However, in accord with the
autonoetic/noetic distinction, the patient experienced this con-
tent as semantic fact rather than as a re-living of his personal past
(since he did not suffer comparable anterograde impairment, he
could, of course, mentally travel back to the experienced events in
which personal knowledge was relearned).
Thus, there is no logical argument or empirical evidence sup-
porting the assertion that only episodic memory makes reference
to the “where and when” of past personal experience. While the
fact that two potentially separate systems share criteria is not a
“death sentence” for a taxonomy, it highlights the severe difficul-
ties faced by those who would adopt the “time, place, and self”
criteria as the basis for classification.
In summary, the “time, space, and self” criterion for distin-
guishing between semantic and episodic memory is insufficient
for the task for which it originally was designed. By contrast, the
autonoetic/noetic criterion for classification does good work both
in capturing a fundamental feature of our memory phenomenol-
ogy and in serving as fertile theoretical and empirical grounds
for exploring the complexities of the types of systems subsumed
under the general designator “memory” (for reviews, seeWheeler,
2000; Markowitsch, 2003; Dere et al., 2008). In the next section I
discuss issues involved in identifying an occurrent mental state as
a memory.
MEMORY EXPERIENCE AND ITS CONNECTION TO THE PAST
The adoption of subjective temporality as a basis for distinguish-
ing between forms of memory trades on the notion that the cri-
teria for classification lie not in the form of content experienced,
but in the manner in which that content is received by conscious-
ness. In one sense, all memory-based content is experienced as
occurrent—it is an act of mind happening now. As Reid puts
it, “Every man can distinguish the thing remembered from the
remembrance of it. We may remember anything we have seen, or
heard, or known, of done, or suffered; but the remembrance of
it is a particular act of the mind which now exists, and of which
we are conscious” (Reid, 1813/1969, pp 324–325). It is the attach-
ment of the “past” to present mental experience (be it imagistic or
propositional) that marks the experience as one of memory rather
than, say, imagination (Reid, by the way, denied the possibility of
imagistic recollection, but that need not concern us at present).
The requirement that a current mental state evoke a sense of
attachment to one’s past to establish it as an act ofmemory (rather
than, say, thought or imagination) long has been recognized. And,
it has been a persistent thorn in the side of psychologists and
philosophers grappling with the problem of placing a current
mental state in a relation to the past. And, for the relation to do
good work, it must be of the “right type.”
So, what is the “right type” of relation between an occurrent
mental state and the past? William James (1890), as so often is
the case, puts the problem in sharp relief: “A farther condition is
required before the present image can be held to stand for a past
original. That condition is the fact that the imagined be expressly
referred to the past, thought as in the past . . . But even that would
not bememory. Memory requires more than mere dating of a fact
in the past. It must be dated in my past. In other words, I must
think that I directly experienced its occurrence. It must have . . .
‘warmth and intimacy’. . . ” (James, 1890, p. 650; emphasis in
original).
Over the years (both prior to and following James’ remarks)
numerous criteria have been proposed to do the work of differ-
entiating memory from a non-memorial mental content.1 Hume
famously proposed that the vivacity of a mental image is a basis
on which we separate an image or thought from a memory, with
memory being more lively and vivacious. He also proposed that
the amount of “free play” we have with our mental states serves as
a useful criterion—in contrast to imagining, for example, when
1Although James also is clear that much of what we now call semantic knowl-
edge would not qualify as memory in his system—lacking, as it does, obvious
reference to one’s past (e.g., 2+ 2 = 4; the sun is hot)—I believe that ref-
erence to the past is overly restrictive and not a necessary criterion for a
mental experience or bodily action tomeet the requirements for being a mem-
ory. A memory is an occurrent mental event that can be shown to have a
causal connection to past experience. On this view, the expression of learning
(whether via mental state or physical act) qualifies as memorial regardless of
whether its current instantiation can be consciously traced to, or felt to derive
from, a previously encountered event or experience, provided the proper
causal connection(s) to a past experience can be demonstrated (via inference,
objective evidence, or felt experience of past). For example, intelligently coor-
dinated movements of the body which draw on the accumulated effect of
knowable past events qualify as memorial despite absence of awareness that
they are causally derived from previous experience (i.e., procedural memory).
Of course, a little thought reveals an obvious circularity in any criterion of
memory that draws on acquaintance (direct or indirect) with the past (i.e.,
memory) as the evidential basis for memory (e.g., Furlong, 1951). This per-
plexing conundrum would take us too far from the issues at hand and thus
will not be dealt with here.
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we remember we have less free play with mental content, since
that content is bound by the past to represent things as they
actually were (Hume, 1748/2004). Russell saw things differently,
proposing that to be considered a memory a mental content
must be accompanied by two feelings—pastness and familiarity
(Russell, 1921).
Among modern psychological investigators, the work of
Johnson and her colleagues represents the most systematic
attempt to tackle this vexing problem (for review, see Johnson and
Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 1993). Their research eventuated in a
set of criteria—e.g., the richness of the contextual and perceptual
elements contained in a mental state. Although these criteria were
proposed primarily to account for discrimination between mem-
ories for thoughts and memories for perceptions, they easily are
adapted for classifying mental content as a memory as opposed to
an act of thought or imagination.
Unfortunately, as theorists and philosophers have discovered,
none of these criteria stand the test of logical analysis or introspec-
tion (for reviews, see Furlong, 1951; Casey, 1977; Warnock, 1987;
Bernecker, 2010). For example, Russell’s and Hume’s assumption
that the content of memory experience is “bound to the past” is
partly undermined by demonstrations that memorial experience
is, at least to a degree, reconstructive (e.g., Bartlett, 1932). And,
we all have had experiences in which an imagination is vivid and
a memory faint (e.g., Warnock, 1987). As Bernecker (2010) con-
cluded, the problem with the memory-markers thus far proposed
is that “they don’t offer a reliable mark” (p. 22). Each is subject
to logical argument and/or empirical demonstration that makes
clear that none of the proposed criteria are either necessary or
sufficient for marking a memory as such.
Considered in this light, the autonoetic/noetic criterion seems
encouraging. While it may not serve as a definitive basis for dis-
tinguishing semantic memory from imagination—both are, by
definition, noetic—it does provide a promising conceptual and
phenomenological basis for identifying present mental content as
part of one’s past. It thus appears to be up to the task—that is, it
provides the “right type” of relation—when the issue at hand is
to determine whether an occurrent mental content is an episodic
memory.
IS AUTONOETIC AWARENESS INTRINSIC TO EPISODIC
RECOLLECTION?
Having argued in support of Tulving’s contention that temporal
subjectivity can serve as a useful basis by which to classify mental
content as memorial, the issue now at hand is this—does subjec-
tive temporality provide sufficient license to conclude that current
mental content represents an episodic, as opposed to a semantic,
memory? As noted, content alone is not sufficient to make this
judgment, since the constituents of both systems of memory can
include temporal, spatial and self-referential elements. By con-
trast, the mode of subjective temporality accompanying an act
of memory is assumed to differ dramatically between episodic
recollection and semantic retrieval.
The content retrieved from semantic memory, on Tulving’s
account, can (at most) be about the past. Retrieval from semantic
memory can be taken as either temporal (Klein et al., 2002b; for
review, see Klein, 2013a) or atemporal (e.g., Klein et al., 2010).
What determines its stance with respect to time is not the quality
of the experience per se, but rather our ability to inferentially refer
the experience to the past on the basis of the content present in
(noetic) awareness. Thus, a causal analysis is required to place an
occurrent semantic memory in a relation to the past.
On the other hand, episodic memory’s connection to the past
is not one of logical inference. Rather, it is pre-reflective, directly
given (e.g., Zahavi, 2005). It is a sense (i.e., a feeling) that my
current mental state stands for, and thus representative of, an
experience in my personal past (e.g., James, 1890). The content
of episodic recollection is given as being of the past; it is accom-
panied by a feeling of mental time travel—that is, re-visiting a
personal experience. This feeling, or sense of attachment, to my
past (which James called “warmth and intimacy” and Russell
labeled “feelings of familiarity and pastness”), is part of the sub-
jective quality of the mental event. As Nagel (1974) might say, the
pastness of an episodic experience is part of “the feeling of what
it is like” to have such an experience. And this feeling (or qualia)
accompanying episodic recollection is made possible by episodic
memory’s association with autonoetic awareness.
The distinction between episodic and semantic memorial
experience can thus be seen as one of differences in manner of
acquaintance (e.g., Russell, 1912/1999). We are acquainted with
semantic pastness indirectly via inference, whereas our acquain-
tance with episodic pastness is directly given as the feeling that
we are re-living our past. If this distinction holds, then a phe-
nomenological state is what differentiates our experience of these
two forms of long-term memory.
So what exactly is the connection between autonoetic aware-
ness and episodic memory? Two possibilities present themselves.
Either (as commonly assumed, though seldom stated), autonoetic
awareness is (1) intrinsic (i.e., necessary) to episodic memory—
i.e., it is a part, or constituent, of “episodic” content, or (2) it has
a relational (i.e., contingent) connection to memory content—
i.e., while under normal circumstances it is observed to be
coextensive with “episodic” content, this connection is one of
contingency rather than necessity.
On the relational view, the neuro-cognitive mechanisms that
make possible autonoetic awareness are functionally independent
of the mechanisms that make available the content of long-term
memory. What makes a memory experience episodic or seman-
tic is not the nature of the content, or the hypothesized system in
which content resides while in “storage,” but rather an act of tem-
poral (or atemporal) awareness that becomes associated with the
content once it has been retrieved.
This is the view I champion in this paper. Although evi-
dence in support is scarce, suggestive findings have been
reported in a study by Piolino and colleagues (2003). Using
the remember/know paradigm (e.g., Tulving, 1985), these inves-
tigators found that patients suffering Alzhiemer’s Disease and
Frontotemporal Dementia report significantly fewer “remember”
responses than do controls. Based on this finding, they conclude
that these two forms of dementia entail impairments specific to
autonoetic awareness. However, whether this impairment occurs
in storage or at retrieval is indeterminate. Moreover, as I discuss in
section “Conclusions,” the proposed relation between remember
judgments and autonoeisis is more suggestive than theoretically
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grounded. I present evidence that bears directly on the rela-
tion between autonoetic awareness and retrieval in section “Can
Autonoetic Awareness be Separated from Episodic Content? The
Case of Patient R. B.”
In sum, the relational view implies that memory content is nei-
ther episodic nor semantic; rather retrieved content is classifiable
as episodic or semantic by virtue of a concurrent act of auto-
neotic awareness, whose association (or lack thereof) is used to
classify an occurrent mental state as episodic or semantic. Seen
in this light, there are no systems of episodic and semantic mem-
ory per se. Rather, there is memory content that can, if a suitable
candidate for temporal specification is present in consciousness
(e.g., “where and when I learned that 2+ 2 = 4,” but not “I know
that 2+ 2 = 4”) can be acted on by the autonoetic subsystem to
confer a sense of temporal subjectivity on the content retrieved.2
EPISODIC MEMORY: A COMPONENTIAL APPROACH
Many contemporary treatments of episodic memory focus on the
encoding, storage and retrieval of memory content (for discus-
sion, see Klein, 2007). However, as Klein et al. (2004) have argued,
theoretical and empirical considerations call into question the
wisdom of such restrictive treatment of memory experience.
Their work makes a strong case that episodic recollection entails
a multiplicity of functionally independent, yet normally interact-
ing, systems, only some of which bear an obvious a priori relation
tomemory taken as the encoding, storage and retrieval of content.
Specifically, Klein et al. (2004) proposed that to experience
memory content as episodic requires, at a minimum, four capa-
bilities. These include (1) a capacity for self-reflection; that is, the
ability to reflect on my own mental states—to know about my
own knowing, (2) a sense of personal agency; that is, the belief
that I am the cause of my thoughts and actions, (3) a sense of
personal ownership; that is, the feeling that my thoughts and
acts belong to me, and (4) the ability to think about time as an
unfolding of personal happenings centered about the self. Klein
and colleagues conceptualized episodic recollection as a mental
state resulting from the finely tuned interplay of these four psy-
chological capacities that, working together, transform a retrieved
content into an episodic experience. It follows that breakdowns
in any of these components (self-reflection, self-agency, self-
ownership, and personal temporality) should produce, in varying
degrees, specific, highly circumscribed impairments in episodic
recollection. A review of the available evidence showed that this
does indeed occur (e.g., Klein, 2001; Klein et al., 2004), lead-
ing the authors to suggest that the subsystems identified may
2One limitation of the present account is that I have no proven criteria for
specifying when autonoetic awareness will act on retrieved content other than
the trivially obvious consideration of content relevance to temporal treatment
[One speculative possibility—which I develop later in this paper—trades on
Nadel and Moscovitch’s (1997) Mutliple Trace Theory]. However, while the
lack of a clear understanding of how and when autonoetic awareness makes
contact with current mental content is an obvious weakness of my proposal, I
do not think the absence of research on a previously un-proposed emendation
to a well-establishedmodel argues, by itself, against the potential worth of my
suggested revision. Rather, it highlights the novelty of the proposal and the
need for conceptual and empirical work before the ideas expressed herein can
transition from plausible to likely.
provide a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient condi-
tions for enabling memory content to be experienced as episodic
recollection.
I will not review the specifics of the subsystems identified by
Klein et al. (2004; for a related view, see Klein, 2011). Rather,
in what follows I focus on one system with direct relevance to
present concerns—the system that enables a feeling of ownership
of one’s mental states—and I discuss its implications for auto-
noetic awareness and its relation to episodic memory experience.
CAN AUTONOETIC AWARENESS BE SEPARATED FROM
EPISODIC CONTENT? THE CASE OF PATIENT R. B.
As noted in Section “Is Autonoetic Awareness Intrinsic to
Episodic Recollection?” if autonoetic awareness is functionally
independent from memory content, then temporal subjectivity
and memory content should be capable of being pried apart. The
case of patient R. B. (reported below), has direct bearing on this
issue.
The idea that ownership of one’s mental states can come
loose from the states, as experienced, is not a novel observation:
A substantial literature (primarily clinical) speaks to the reality
of this possibility. For example, in a largely speculative treat-
ment, Jaynes (1976) argued that prior to acquiring the capacity
to confer ownership on conscious thought our ancestors were
unable to accurately localize the origination of “voices heard”
in their heads. Less speculative evidence comes from cases of
thought insertion in schizophrenics suffering delusional symp-
toms (e.g., Frith, 1992; Gallagher, 2000; Northoff, 2000; Bortolotti
and Broome, 2009; for review, see Stephens and Graham, 2000).
However, while these cases support the realizability, and thus con-
ceivability, of a lack of personal ownership of one’s mental states,
schizophrenic patients apparent memories, even in early stages of
the disorder, likely are delusions in some sense (e.g., Northoff,
2000; Klein and Nichols, 2012), and this renders such cases less
than optimal as demonstrations that memory (as opposed to, say,
delusion) and ownership can come apart.
Of particular importance, then, is the case of patient R. B. (the
details are summarized herein. A fuller treatment can be found
in Klein and Nichols, 2012). As a result of a serious accident,
R. B. suffered, in addition to severe physical injuries, a number of
cognitive impairments. These included difficulty in maintaining
attention, mild aphasia, and retrograde and anterograde amnesia
for events in close temporal proximity to the accident. His perfor-
mance on tests of verbal fluency and short-termmemory span fell
below the scores provided by neurologically healthy age-matched
controls.
While in the hospital, R. B. was placed on morphine (IV drip,
followed by pills) and Oxycontin to alleviate the considerable pain
he endured. As the intensity of his pain subsided, he weaned him-
self off medication. Importantly, at the time of testing R. B. was
not on any pain medication. In addition, his long and short-term
memory impairments, aphasia and fluency deficits had resolved.
Not all cognitive function, however, had returned to nor-
mal. Of direct bearing on the question at hand—the relation
of autonoetic awareness to episodic memory—R. B. was able
to remember particular incidents from his life accompanied by
clear temporal, spatial and self-referential content. But he did not
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feel the content experienced belonged to him. In his words, they
lacked “ownership”3 (in the descriptive language of James, Russell,
and Hume, his “memories” lacked feelings of warmth, intimacy,
and personal pastness). Viewed in terms of episodic criteria, his
mental states presented content adhering to the original episodic
criteria, but divorced from autonoetic awareness.
This particular type of memory impairment—recollection
absent a sense of personal ownership—is a form of memory
dissociation that, to my knowledge, has not previously been docu-
mented in the amnesic literature (Klein and Nichols, 2012). There
are, however, two cases that bear similarity. One is from a study
of an amnesic reported by Talland (1964). Unfortunately, the data
available from that brief report, while suggesting a similar dissoci-
ation, are too limited to support strong conclusions. In the other
case (touched on earlier in this paper), a patient relearned his
“personal history” following a case of severe retrograde episodic
amnesia spanning most of his past life (Stuss and Guzman, 1988).
The patient commented that the relearned memories seemed to
lack a feel of real happenings in his life. They were, to him, more
like stories and facts told to him by others (which, indeed, they
were!). In this sense, they were more like semantic facts about
himself (e.g. Klein and Gangi, 2010; Klein and Lax, 2010) than
episodic recollections: The patient knew his memories were about
him, but he did not remember them as temporally and spatially
acquired in the correct context (that is, when the original acts
transpired). Instead, they were memories that temporally and
spatially were correctly experienced as second-hand stories told
to him at a particular time and place (i.e., they consisted in the
recollection of information acquired following the onset of his
retrograde memory loss).
So, are R. B.’s memories episodic or semantic? The reported
content suggests the former, but R. B.’s reported experience
suggests the latter. Almost immediately following his accident,
R. B. was able to intentionally retrieve specific events tempo-
rally and spatially situated in his personal past. But, as noted, his
memories were compromised in an unusual manner—retrieval of
events, though fitting the standard criteria for episodic recollec-
tion (i.e., time, place, and about R. B.), were unaccompanied by a
sense of personal ownership. And, absent that sense, the ability
to feel these memories as emanating from his personal past—
to mentally travel to the time in which the events represented
by his current thought and images originally transpired—was
lost.
Lacking the experience of personal ownership, R. B. simulta-
neously lost a direct, personal connection with his past. It thus
appears that loss of ownership equates to an inability to draw
on the resources provided by autonoetic awareness to identify
3It is important to note that ownership of one’s mental states admits to sev-
eral instantiations. For example one can have “perspectival” ownership of the
content of a mental state. This implies only that one is aware that the experi-
enced state is taking place in his or her mind. R. B. clearly maintains this form
of ownership. By contrast, “personal” ownership is lacking in R. B. While he
understands that the memories he experiences present themselves to his con-
sciousness, he does not feel as though they are his own. Lacking this form of
ownership, he is unable to autonoetically experience the content of his mental
states as expressly referring to events from his past. For detailed discussions of
forms of ownership, see Albahari (2006) and Locke (1968).
the content of a current mental state as a part of one’s personal
history. For example, approximately 2 months following release
from the hospital, R. B. offered the following description of what
it is like for him to recall personal events:
“. . . I did not own any memories that came before my injury.
I knew things that came before my injury. In fact, it seemed
that my memory was just fine for things that happened going
back years in the past (the period close to the injury was more
disrupted). I could answer any question about where I lived at
different times in my life, who my friends were, where I went to
school, activities I enjoyed. But none of it was ‘me.’ It was the same
sort of knowledge I might have about how my parents met or the
history of the Civil War or something like that.”
Inmy review of taxonomies of long-termmemory, I noted that
psychologists traditionally have characterized episodic recollec-
tions as temporal, spatial, and self-referential. By these criteria,
R. B.’s descriptions of his memorial experience leave little doubt
that they are episodic recollections, appropriately situated in time
and space, rather than factual, atemporal semantic knowledge.
As I also suggested, however, there is no principled reason why
a semantic fact could not contain spatial, temporal and self-
referential content, or be correctly referred to a person’s past—
albeit a past constructed inferentially rather than autonoetically
given. And therein resides a puzzle. Do R. B.’s unowned memories
consist in episodic content divorced from its relational connec-
tion to autonoetic awareness, or are they rather un-categorized
(i.e., as episodic or semantic) content retrieved from storage but
divorced from the sense of personal ownership conferred by an
act of autoneotic awareness?
R. B. addresses the question directly. When asked to recall of
events from his childhood he replies:
“I was remembering scenes, not facts . . . I was recalling
scenes . . . that is . . . I could clearly recall a scene of me at the
beach in New London with my family as a child. But the feeling
was that the scene was not my memory. As if I was looking at a
photo of someone else’s vacation.”
All of R. B.’s memories were substantiated by third parties
as valid renditions of events that actually transpired in his life.
While his recollections satisfy the traditional criteria for episodic
memory—time, place, and self-accompanied by clear imagis-
tic representation of (typically) unique events (see below for
additional examples)—they simultaneously exhibit an absence
of experienced ownership: While he can infer that the events
recalled must be representative of past personal experience, he
does not know this by virtue of a direct, felt connection to
the past. In short, he has no sense of re-living the experiences
retrieved.
The absence of ownership also is evident in R. B.’s response
to instructions to recall personal memories from time spent in
graduate school:
“I can picture the scene perfectly clearly . . . studying with
my friends in our study lounge. I can ‘relive’ it in the sense of
re-running the experience of being there. But it has the feeling
of imagining, (as if) re-running an experience that my parents
described from their college days. It did not feel like it was some-
thing that really had been a part of my life. Intellectually I suppose
I never doubted that it was a part of my life. Perhaps because there
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was such continuity of memories that fit a pattern that lead up to
the present time. But that in itself did not help change the feeling
of ownership.”
He continues:
“Things that were in the present, like my name, I continue to
own. Having been to MIT had two different issues . . . my mem-
ories of having been at MIT I did not own. Those scenes of being
at MIT were vivid, but they were not mine. But I owned ‘the fact
that I had a degree from MIT’. . . that might have simply been a
matter of rational acceptance of fact.”
Once again, R. B.’s memory performance adheres to the tradi-
tional definition of episodic recollection: He can vividly remem-
ber where the specific event transpired, when the specific event
took place, and that it directly involved him. But, autonoetic
awareness is missing. In short, on the view presented here, the
notions of episodic and semantic can be seen to refer not to dif-
ferent stores or systems of memory content, but rather to how
that content, once retrieved, is acted on by mechanisms (infer-
ential or autonoetic) to enact a reference to one’s past (note:
not all memory content can be mapped to the past2). This pro-
posal is reflected in the way R. B. treats his perspectival, but
not personally, owned pre-injury memory content, both dur-
ing its separation from autonoetic awareness and following their
eventual recoupling—at which point memory retrieval previously
experienced as “unowned” takes on a decidedly episodic flavor:
SBK: “Can you recall personally important events from your
pre-injury period?”
RB: “I remember things that came before my injury. In fact,
it seems that my memory is just fine for things that happened
going back years in the past. I can answer questions about where
I lived at different times in my life, who my friends were, where I
went to school, activities I enjoyed . . . but . . . to clarify . . . I am
remembering scenes, not facts. Since I am remembering scenes,
I think this means I am dealing with exactly what you are asking
about.”
SBK: “Can you recall who you are? More specifically, what you
were like and what you are like—that is, your trait characteristics.
If so, are your traits felt as your own?”
RB: “Yes, I know what I am like . . . intelligent, shy, honest, a
good person, things like that? Yes, I definitely have no identity
problem. And the memories created since the injury I have full
ownership of.”4
SBK: “Can you recall for me a personal event concerning your
time at college that would involve knowing what happened to you
as a personal experience. Or is the recall more of a factual nature?”
RB: “I can see the scene in my head. I’m studying with friends
in the lounge at my residence hall. I am able to re-live it. I have
a feeling . . . a sense of being at there, at MIT, in the lounge.
4Note that despite his ownership/autonetic limitations, R. B.’s responses
exhibit a clear sense of self both narratively and factually. Thus, it is reason-
able to conclude that his memory issues are not traceable to impairments of
self (Klein et al’s, 2004, subsystem #1). In addition, throughout his period
of impairment he exhibits a clear and precise ability to perform a requested
retrieval, thus demonstrating intact agency with regard to memory (which
suggests, in turn, that subsystem #2 has not unduly been impacted by his
injuries). That he has an intact sense of agency also can be seen from his
remarks as the interview continues.
But it doesn’t feel like I own it. It’s like I’m imagining, re-living
the experience but it was described by someone else.”
SBK: “Can you recall memories whenever you desire to do so?”
RB: “I can recall memories (from the non-ownership period of
his life) at will. I have normal control over remembering facts and
scenes from my past. But when I remember scenes from before
the injury, they do not feel as if they happened to me—though
intellectually I know they did—they feel as if they happened to
someone else.”
With respect to the recovery of episodic ownership:
“When I did ‘take ownership’ of amemory, it was actually quite
isolated. A single memory I might own, yet another memory con-
nected to it I would not own. It was a startling experience to have
no rhyme or reason to which memories I slowly took ownership
of, one at a time at random over a period of weeks and months.”
He continues:
“What happened over the coming months . . . was interesting.
Every once in a while, I would suddenly think about something in
my past and I would ‘own’ it. That was indeed something ‘I’ had
done and experienced. Over time, one by one, I would come to
‘own’ different memories. Eventually, after perhaps 8 months or
so, it seemed as if it was all owned . . . as if once enough individual
memories were owned, it was all owned. For example, the MIT
memory, the one in the lounge . . . I now own it. It’s clearly part
of my life, my past.”
SUMMING UP: THE CASE OF PATIENT R. B. AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR EPISODIC MEMORY
There appears to be an intimate connection with, and possibil-
ity of separation between, the content of a memory experience
and whether that experience is autonoetic. R. B.’s confusion with
regard to “content ownership” highlights the intimate relation
between autonoetic awareness and ownership: Absent a sense of
ownership, R. B. cannot mentally travel back in time to claim
as his own the re-presentation of the experience from which the
occurrent content was derived. Instead he relies on inference and
logical possibility to (often correctly) infer that, given the specific
elements of the content retrieved, it likely represents aspects of his
personal past.
The apparent paradox presented by the case of patient R. B.—
episodic-like content absent the feeling of personal owner-
ship (and thus lived pastness)—can be understood by situating
episodic memory in the context of a system of interrelated mem-
ory processes, some of which provide the raw data for experience
(i.e., content) and some of which enable the experience to be
“mine” (for extended treatments, see Klein, 2004, 2010, 2012;
Klein et al., 2004; Klein and Nichols, 2012). R. B.’s recollections
during his “unowned” period can be explained in the context of
the view that there is specialized neural machinery that acts on
retrieved content (of the right sort; e.g., Footnote 2) to confer on
it a sense of re-living a personal experience—i.e., episodic recol-
lection. This neural machinery in R. B. seems to have been com-
promised by his injury, but only for those events that occurred in
the time period preceding his injury. That is, R. B. suffered a form
of retrograde amnesia that compromised his ability to experience
his personal recollections as his own. During the non-ownership
period, R. B. had memory of pre-injury events and could locate
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them, via inference, in his personal past. But he lacked a sense
of numerical personal identity with the experiences retrieved.
The case of R. B. thus suggests that the sense of numerical per-
sonal identity is quite narrowly circumscribed: R. B. had factual
self-knowledge, trait self-knowledge, and knowledge of person-
ally experienced episodes, but he did not have a pre-reflectively
given sense of continuity with his past person.
Importantly, during his “unowned” period R. B. had no trou-
ble retrieving very specific, often one-of-a kind, personal expe-
riences (e.g., being on a beach in New London). He presumably
also had no trouble representing that his body was present for
those experiences. He knew that the memories were about him
rather than, say, his mother. And he could call up, that is, auto-cue
(Donald, 1991) memories at will. So, in that sense, his memo-
ries were both agentic and involved self-reference. However, there
seems to be another type of self-reference that typically accompa-
nies episodic recollections (ownership, mineness; for discussion,
see Klein, 2012) that has been impaired in his case. His appar-
ent deficit was in representing, from the first person, “I had these
experiences.” That is, his impairment entailed a loss of the abil-
ity to connect personally experienced content with autonoetic
awareness.
A MECHANISM: ONE PROPOSAL
Although the specifics of R. B.’s deficit are, at this point, unclear,
it is worth considering the present findings in light of theoreti-
cal work by Dalla Barba and colleagues (e.g., Dalla Barba, 2002;
Dalla Barba et al., 1997, 1999) on the relation between con-
sciousness, memory, and temporal experience. These authors call
attention to two modes of consciousness, which they term tem-
poral consciousness (TC) and knowing consciousness (KC). TC
is consciousness of time—it enables a person to become aware of
something as part of his or her personal past, present, or future. It
thus corresponds closely to what Tulving calls autonoetic aware-
ness. KC, by contrast, does not locate objects in time. Rather, it
enables a person to become aware of something as an element
of knowledge without that knowledge being situated in a tempo-
ral framework. The conceptual overlap with noetic awareness is
evident.
TC and KC thus conceptualized are two different ways of
addressing the contents of memory. Long-termmemory is held to
contain representations that vary in terms of their stability and
resistance to modification (e.g., Dalla Barba et al., 1997, 1999;
Nadel andMoscovitch, 1997). Themore stable, overlearned, sum-
mary representations can be thought of as roughly analogous to
what will be experienced, on retrieval, as semantic knowledge,
whereas less stable, moremalleable representations—e.g., unique,
one-of-a-kind-events—provide the raw material for what will
subsequently become episodic recollection.
Support for these proposed distinctions in content stability
can be found in Nadel and Moscovitch’s (1997; Moscovitch et al.,
2005) multiple trace theory (MTT) of long-term memory con-
solidation (see also Piolino et al., 2003). According to MTT, the
hippocampal formation and related structures (primarily in the
medial temporal lobes) contribute to the transformation of ini-
tially unstable and sparsely encoded content into a collection
of contextually related traces—a transformative act that confers
stability on represented content by virtue of its multiple instan-
tiations. The model, developed to map the neural events and
structures underlying the transition of information from episodic
to semantic memory (i.e., unstable to stable), fits reasonably well
with Dalla Barba’s proposal that differences in representational
stability determine whether a given memory content will be taken
an as object by TC and KC.
But, in what sense does the relative stability (or a lack thereof)
confer a temporal status on a specific content? That is, what deter-
mines if the content, as experienced, is classified as episodic or as
semantic? Dalla Barba (2002) suggests that the stability of a repre-
sentation is correlated with what we typically describe as episodic
memory by virtue of the fact that TC takes such content as its
intentional object (for a discussion of why this may be the case,
see Klein et al., 2002a). In this way, temporally and representa-
tionally unique events are likely to be experienced episodically
as part of one’s past. By contrast, the memory content psychol-
ogists classify as semantic often, though not invariably, tends to
be represented as stable, summaries of (often repeated) expe-
riences that share features in common. While such content is
acted on by KC rather than by TC (i.e., autonoetic awareness),
there is nothing in Dalla Barba’s model that precludes KC (i.e.,
noetic awareness) from recruiting an individual’s logical abili-
ties to inferentially place “stable” content in a temporal context,
provided the representation being addressed contains temporally-
relevant constituents. When this happens, the individual is able to
locate well-learned, multiply-represented facts about the world in
a temporal matrix that extends from the chronological past to the
chronological future (e.g., “I know I lived in New York until I was
2 years old, even though I can’t recollect any specific event from
that time of my life”).
Unfortunately, as the reader will have noted, Dalla Barba’s
“explanation” begs the question of what causes the observed
correlation between type of temporal subjectivity and stability
of content. At present, a compelling explanation is not read-
ily at hand. Despite its conceptual limitations, however, Dalla
Barba’s model, in conjunction with MTT, provides a provisional
(though incomplete) framework for making sense of the dissocia-
tion between the experiential and inferential forms of temporality
experienced by patient R. B. As the result of a condition in which
autonoetic awareness is intact, but unable to access pre-injury
content in long-term memory, R. B. remains capable of describ-
ing, often in considerable detail, what happened in his pre-injury
past—despite being unable to experience his present mental con-
tent as a re-living of past personal events. By contrast, autonoetic
awareness still can, for reasons not clear, successfully work in con-
junction with his post-injury memory content. What we see in the
case of R. B. is not a failure of memory content, or a loss of the
autonoetic component of recollection, but rather a dissociation
between two intact, yet functionally independent, constituents
of what, taken in tandem, are essential constituents of what we
classify as episodic recollection.
The merit of this explanation of the relation between con-
tent and experience is further supported by R. B.’s subsequent
recovery of the ability to episodically recollect the same mem-
ory content that lacked personal ownership during the period
of his cognitive impairment. That R. B. was able to regain these
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functions suggests that the autoneotic aspect of his recollections
was not destroyed by his injury; rather it temporarily became
decoupled frommemory content. The proposition that the mech-
anisms mediating autonoetic awareness were not lost during his
amnesia also is implied by the fact that he had a sense of personal
ownership of ongoing experiences that transpired following his
accident (with the exception of temporally limited anterograde
memory loss). Why his mental machinery was able to conjoin
autonoetic awareness with content as memories were being built,
but not when recollecting memories of pre-injury events, remains
unclear.
CONCLUSIONS
The sense of a direct, pre-reflective attachment to the past given
by episodic recollection is robust, indeed, it has seemed to many
to be a necessary aspect of episodic memory (for reviews, see
Tulving, 1985, 2002; Wheeler et al., 1997). It also gives us an “irre-
sistible” sense of being the same person over time (e.g., Fivush and
Haden, 2003; for discussion, see Klein, 2013b). But the case of R.
B. indicates that this sense is dissociable from memory content.
The feeling of autonoetic personal continuity (and its intimate
relation to personal ownership) turns out to be a contingent
feature of memory content that comes into play at retrieval.
Seen in this light, classification of content as episodic or
semantic can be situated in processes that transpire once memory
content is retrieved and made available for conscious experience.
It is at this point that the designators episodic and semantic do
the work they were developed to perform. This work is achieved
via the individual’s ability to connect a current mental state to
a past experience via either autonoetic awareness (temporarily
lost in R. B, but subsequently regained) or logical inference. The
former maps to what we call episodic memory, while the latter
enables temporally located semantic knowledge—i.e., the inten-
tional placement of retrieved content in the context of one’s
past (provided the content has useable temporal, spatial and
self-referential markers).
Of course, R. B.’s reports do not rule out the possibility that
what he is reporting are inferences based on semantic memory
system (as his responses make clear, he is capable of inference)
rather than “un-labeled” memory content that lacks a felt con-
nection to his past due to compromised autonoetic awareness.
However, this possibility assumes that semantic memory is a sys-
tem whose instantiation is a biological reality prior to an act of
retrieval—a conceptual stance which theoretical and empirical
observations presented in this paper call into question. Moreover,
Occam’s principle of parsimony—i.e., posit no more parame-
ters or variables than are minimally necessary to account for the
data (e.g., Ladyman, 2002)—appears to side with the view that
memory content is classifiable neither as episodic or semantic
while still in storage. Of the two possibilities under discussion,
the retrieval-based alternative offers the simpler explanation—
positing a single source of content that can be differentially acted
on by autonoetic awareness. By contrast, the traditional classifi-
cation of episodic and semantic memory as unique, but interact-
ing, neuro-cognitive systems assumes two separate repositories
of content (episodic and semantic) which also are differentially
associated with autonoesis.
Occam’s razor resonates with evolutionary considerations as
well. Evolution builds on existing biological structures (e.g.,
Williams, 1966). Consistent with this thesis, Fuster (1995) has
demonstrated a strong overlap among humans and phylogenet-
ically older mammalian species in the cortical areas involved in
memory. Accordingly, positing a pre-existing cortical network of
memory content that subsequently was overlain withmechanisms
that acted differentially on retrieved content to enable conscious
experience to be taken as either episodic or semantic has econom-
ically favorable consequences. Specifically, it has the effect of elim-
inating the need to posit the evolution of separate systems of stor-
age for episodic and semantic content, as well as separate mech-
anisms (i.e., autonoetic and noetic) for consciously experiencing
that content as episodic recollection or semantic knowledge.
These considerations also offer an evolutionary perspective
on the well-known finding that some species (e.g., scrub jays),
lacking some of the structures assumed necessary for episodic
recollection (e.g., personal ownership, sense of self), nonetheless
behave as though their acts were mediated by recollection (e.g.,
Cheke and Clayton, 2010). Such behavior can parsimoniously be
explained by assuming these species have a network for storing
memory content, some which contains information about time
and place, but have yet to evolve the mechanisms necessary to
place that content into subjective alignment with their personal
past. Thus, they can use their knowledge to appropriately guide
behavior without that knowledge being experienced as part of
their personal past.
The retrieval-based model of episodic and semantic memory
also may help explain the well-known finding that the experi-
ence of remembering often is characterized by either a feeling
of knowing or a feeling of remembering (for reviews, see Cohen
et al., 2008 and Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). A pop-
ular dual systems explanation for variation in modes of retrieval
experience is that feelings of remembering reflect the operation of
episodic memory whereas the feelings of familiarity are associated
with semantic memory (e.g., Tulving, 1985).
In contrast to dual systems analyses, a retrieval-based model
proposes that whether content retrieved from memory is expe-
rienced as remembered or as known depends on whether it
has been subject to autonoetic consciousness: If it has, the con-
tent is experienced as remembered; if not, it is experienced
as known. This explanation has the advantage of avoiding the
problem (common to dual systems models) of explaining why
stimuli encoded under the same temporal and spatial conditions
are stored in, and subsequently retrieved from, one system vs.
another. A retrieval-based model posits that all stimuli are stored
in the same neural system; any difference in mode of presenta-
tion pivots on whether or not content is acted on by autonoetic
awareness at retrieval.
Although this model has the advantage of conceptual and
phylogenetic parsimony (e.g., a single system of storage), an obvi-
ous limitation is that identification of the factors responsible for
whether retrieved content will be subject to autonoetic embellish-
ment is, at present, unknown. However, a similar indictment can
be pressed against most process-based explanations of the remem-
ber/known phenomenon. Regardless of whether one subscribes to
a dual or single process explanation (e.g., Tulving, 1985; Gardiner
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and Java, 1990; Donaldson, 1996; Wixted and Mickes, 2010; for
review see Cohen et al., 2008), there is no compelling a priori basis
for linking variations in autonoetic awareness to the potency of
causally-relevant factors (such as trace strength, fluency, decision
criteria, and automaticity); rather, these processes are invoked
post hoc to explain observed variation in participants’ retrieval
phenomenology.5
At present, there is no conclusive theoretical or empirical
evidence to select between a systems-based and retrieval-based
explanation of the episodic/semantic distinction (I address the
untidy nature of neural localization studies of memory in the
next section). Occam’s principle, while supportive of a retrieval-
based view, is best treated as a logically non-binding heuristic
rather than as a definitive arbiter of theoretical substantiation.
Compelling empirical evidence in support of a retrieval-based
interpretation comes from the fact that, on recovery of his sense
ownership, the same content formerly unconnected to R. B.’s per-
sonal past re-acquired a sense of being an episodic recollection.
While definitive evidence for a retrieval-based theory of episodic
and semantic memory is not available at present, R. B.’s memory
performance, taken in conjunction with considerations of parsi-
mony and evolution, suggest this option should be considered a
live possibility.
THE NEURAL LOCALIZATION OF EPISODIC AND SEMANTIC MEMORY
The localization of episodic (and semantic) memory in their neu-
ral substrates has been a task that has captured the interest of
neuro-imagers for several decades (for reviews, see Squire, 2004;
Moscovitch et al., 2006; Martinelli et al., 2012; Renoult et al.,
in press). However, despite guarded optimism initially expressed
that the goal of localization of the relevant networks was “in sight”
(e.g., Nyberg et al., 1996), the complexities underlying these early
forays soon became evident. Researchers were led to conclude
that the networks associated with episodic and semantic mem-
ory are widely distributed in the brain (e.g., the parietal lobes,
the frontal lobes, medial temporal lobes; e.g., Nyberg and Tulving,
1998; Moscovitch et al., 2005; Wagner et al., 2005; Burianova and
Grady, 2007; Squire and Bayley, 2007; Cappa, 2008; Ryan et al.,
2008; Eichenbaum et al., 2012; for review, see Svoboda et al.,
2006; Uttal, 2009), that their boundaries were fluid, and that their
constituents varied as a function of the task performed, content
5To quote Bartlett (1932), the processes invoked “. . . may show us what can
happen when recognition takes place, but throw no light whatever upon how
any, or all, of these processes are rendered possible . . . experimenters have ana-
lyzed the final stage of recognition and each has tended to claim a complete
solution in terms of his particular analysis. In fact, nobody can understand
recognition by confining his attention to what happens at the moment of
recognition.” (p. 192). Bartlett goes on to say that future experimentation
focusing on the mental events that precede recognition will aid in under-
standing variability in the processes subsequently at work. If one substitutes
retrieval (e.g., recall and recognition) for recognition, the quote from Bartlett
perfectly captures my critique of process-based explanations of the remem-
ber/know phenomenon. This critique applies to my retrieval-based proposal
as well: As it currently stands, a retrieval-based model cannot account for vari-
ability in the attachment of autonoetic awareness to memory content. This is
not cause for dismay; rather, as Bartlett notes, it simply points out the need
for further experimentation designed to clarify how the processing differences
apparent at retrieval are put into place.
retrieved, and a host of related factors such as the individual’s
age, handedness, gender, clinical status, and emotional state (e.g.,
Achim and Lepage, 2003; Bartha et al., 2003; Schwindt and Black,
2009; Smith and Squire, 2009; for review, see Dumit, 2004). Not
surprisingly, even the manner in which constructs of interest were
operationalized had important effects on the cortical regions acti-
vated (e.g., Renoult et al., in press). One might argue that there
is as much evidence for the incoherence of the underlying con-
structs as there is for the complexities of the issues involved in
designing studies, analyzing data and interpreting findings from
brain-mapping endeavors (e.g., Uttal, 2001).
A possible reason for the diversity of imaging results is that
episodic memory is not something to be neurally localized—
it is not a thing to be found. Rather, it consists in a collection
of functionally independent, but normally interacting functions
(e.g., Klein, 2001; Klein et al., 2004), which, as the present study
demonstrates, can differentially be impaired due to neurological
damage (for reviews, see McCarthy and Warrington, 1992; Klein
et al., 2004). As Polanyi (1967) cautioned “. . . either you know
what you are looking for, and then there is no problem; or you do
not know what you are looking for, and then you cannot expect
to find anything” (p. 22).
Despite the difficulties of the enterprise, there are several con-
clusions that can provisionally be drawn from studies imaging
episodic and semantic memory. Of particular relevance to present
considerations, a number of labs have converged on the medial
temporal lobes as a common network underlying episodic and
semantic consolidation and storage (e.g., Scoville and Milner,
1957; Achim and Lepage, 2003; Bartha et al., 2003; Piolino et al.,
2003; Levy et al., 2004; Moscovitch et al., 2005; Svoboda et al.,
2006; Ryan et al., 2008; Smith and Squire, 2009; Naya and Suzuki,
2011; Rosenbaum et al., 2012; Eichenbaum et al., 2012). In addi-
tion, these networks also are implicated in the consolidation and
storage of declarative memory content (for review, see Fuster,
1995; Squire, 2004). While highly speculative, I suggest that these
regions of activation may reflect the storage of memory content
prior to its subsequent demarcation as semantic and episodic via
mechanisms acting at retrieval. By contrast, a number of inves-
tigators have suggested that autonoetic awareness depends on
mechanisms residing primarily in the frontal lobes (e.g., Abraham
et al., 2009; for reviews, see Wheeler et al., 1997; Szpunar, 2011;
Tulving and Szpunar, 2012).
THE EPISODIC/SEMANTIC DICHOTOMY AND DECLARATIVE MEMORY
An implication of my proposal, in partial agreement with Squire
and his colleagues, is that cortical separation of memory systems
may better be captured by a declarative/procedural dichotomy
(where episodic and semantic systems are folded into, rather than
constituents of, declarative long-termmemory; e.g., Cohen, 1984;
Squire, 2004) than by a taxonomy in which episodic and seman-
tic memory are seen as conceptually and neurologically distinct
constituents of the declarative system (e.g., Schacter and Tulving,
1994; for discussion, see Foster and Jelicic, 1999).
But—and this is an important caveat—my concession to the
declarative/procedural model comes at the level of the neural
instantiation of memory content, not at the level of phenomenol-
ogy once that content has been retrieved and made available
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as an object for subjectivity. Accordingly, the episodic/semantic
division of long-term memory is not subsumed by declarative
memory (as Squire and colleagues might argue); rather, the
episodic/semantic division of memory comes into play at the level
of retrieval rather than storage.
This view can accommodate several conflicting findings in the
literature. For example, while some clinical dissociations between
intact and impaired memory function appear best classified in
terms of a functional independence of episodic and semantic
memory (for reviews, see Schacter and Tulving, 1994; Klein, 2004,
2010; Dere et al., 2008), other results do not fit as neatly into
this scheme (e.g., Cohen, 1984; Squire, 1987; Kopelman et al.,
1989; Klein et al., 2002c). In fact, an unambiguous sorting of
spared and preserved function into the categories provided by the
episodic/semantic distinction more often is the exception than the
rule (e.g., Squire, 1987; Baddeley et al., 1995; Parkin, 1997; Foster
and Jelicic, 1999; Klein et al., 2002c; Moscovitch et al., 2006).
However, recognition of the possibility that an episodic/
semantic classification of memory impairment is attendant on
contingencies acting at retrieval can accommodate the diversity
of results. Specifically, impairments acting primarily on stored
content may result in impairments to both episodic and semantic
memory experience, whereas separation between these two forms
of memory phenomenology is more likely to be observed when
neuro-cognitive impairments act on the mechanisms operative
during retrieval.
Evidence for this proposal comes from the case of patient D. B.,
who suffered brain damage as a result of anoxia following cardiac
arrest (e.g., Klein et al., 2002b,c). Neuropsychological assessment
of D. B.’s temporal orientation showed severe disorientation with
respect to the present. For example, he did not know the day
of the week, the current year, or even his age. Additional test-
ing revealed that D. B. was unable to recall his past and unable
to imagine what his experiences might be like in the future (for
review, see Klein, 2013b). Not surprisingly, D. B.’s episodic mem-
ory was severely impaired: He could not reliably bring to mind
personal experiences from any point in his past (at least within
the limits of testing). By “reliably” I mean the while D. B. typically
responded to requests for episodic memories with “I don’t know,”
he occasionally did offer a specific “recollection.” However, these
“recollections” lacked rational placement in his past. For example,
in response to the request that he remember a time he was in a car,
D. B. replied “Driving down the coast with my parents.” When
then asked to temporally place the memory, he replied “yester-
day,” despite his parents having been dead for 34 years! Thus,
an occurrent mental state (the content of which was verified by
his daughter) appears to have broken free of its temporal moor-
ings. That is, the content of memory, absent autonoetic temporal
placement, constituted the object of D. B.’s awareness.
What I am arguing is that patients such as R. B. and D. B.
may suffer from a disruption of autonoetic awareness, and that
as a result of this pathology they are rendered unable to experi-
ence mental content in its proper temporal context (for a similar
views, see Tulving, 1985; Dalla Barba, 2002). It is the failure to
connect autonoetic awareness with retrieved content rather than
the absence of such awareness, that accounts for (at least some) of
the memory pathologies demonstrated by amnesic patients.
This is not to presume that all forms of episodic amnesia
submit to similar analysis. Memory loss can result from failures
at encoding, storage and/or retrieval. One could, for example,
present symptoms consistent with episodic amnesia if s/he main-
tained the requisite mechanisms for temporal subjectivity, but
lacked access to the content on which that awareness could be
brought to bear. Content loss can be highly selective. According
to MTT, less stable (and hence more autonoetically-relevant) con-
tent is likely to be under-represented in memory. It thus is more
susceptible to neural insult than are the more richly distributed
representations that ultimately will constitute semantic mem-
ory experience (e.g., Nadel and Moscovitch, 1997). In this way,
episodic amnesia will manifest more readily than sematic amnesia
(as is well-recognized to be the case)—the result of disease pro-
cesses acting on content storage prior to operations taking place
at retrieval. What I am suggesting, then, is that some (though cer-
tainly not all!) forms of amnesia can arise from the decoupling of
temporal awareness and memory content (for a similar view, see
Tulving, 1985).
Another area of research that submits to a retrieval-based
analysis is the debate surrounding the mechanisms underlying
false memories (for review, see Schacter, 1995; Johnson and
Raye, 1998). According to the present model, memory errors can
result when (1) compromised content is taken as the object of
autonoteic awareness as well as (2) when autonoetic awareness is
misapplied (e.g., to imagination). The phenomenon of implicit
task performance also can be explained (in some cases) as the
failure of autonoetic awareness to placememory content in a tem-
poral context. While both of these phenomena (false and implicit
memory) deserve considerably more attention, restrictions of
space prevent further elaboration.
LIMITATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
An issue raised concerning the model I have presented is that
it seems more a philosophical exercise that a scientific theory.
Concern centers on the fact that evidence in support of my
ideas derives primarily (though not exclusively: e.g., patient D.
B, thought insertion) from the study of a single patient (R. B.)
who now has remitted. Accordingly, it is hard to see how the ideas
I have proposed can be tested via experimental manipulation.
There are several things to note in this regard.
First, not all theory-based scientific enterprises admit to
empirical manipulation (e.g., cosmology, paleontology). While
the potential for refutation is essential (e.g., Popper), refutation
does not mandate explicit manipulation in an experimental con-
text (e.g., Trusted, 1987; Lipton, 1991). A good theory is one
that retrodicts and predicts, both of which afford the potential
for refutation in the absence of the ability to directly manipulate
variables of interest.
Second, a good theory facilitates the organization of data
sets that might otherwise have been viewed as collections of
unrelated findings (e.g., Newell, 1973; Ladyman, 2002; Godfrey-
Smith, 2003). Along these lines, the present theory has the
virtue of offering a parsimonious explanation for a variety of
“apparently” diverse memory phenomena, including, but not
limited to, remember/know judgments, the implicit/explicit
memory distinction, false memories and Déjà vu experience
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(to be discussed in a forthcoming paper). It also can account
for the fact that some individuals suffering Dissociative Identity
Disorders experience the same episodic content (e.g., Dorahy,
2001) despite content ownership varying as a function of the
personality currently occupying awareness (e.g., Braude, 1995).
The theory also accounts for the fact that episodic and semantic
content evidence significant (often indistinguishable) overlap
with regard the presumably differentiating features of time, place
and self (e.g., Klein and Lax, 2010).
Third, the availability of theory can help to draw attention
to neurological case studies whose relevance for the study (in
this case, of memory) has, to date, been underappreciated. For
example, Zahn et al. (2007) report the case of a patient D. P.,
who lost his ability experience ownership of the mental states
accompanying perceived objects. In a case described by Gott
et al. (1984), the patient (J. J.) was capable of holding either of
two qualitatively different states of consciousness. Specifically,
she was voluntarily able to switch between the feeling that
her experiences belonged to her or to someone else. Finally, a
patient described by Sass and Parnas (2003) reported that his
feeling ownership accompanying his mental states lagged behind
his initial awareness of those states. This “phenomenological
delay in felt ownership” suggests that ownership is a separable
component of consciousness—i.e., the patient temporarily was
aware of having an experience, but only subsequently felt that his
first-person perspective belonged to him.
Taken together, these studies focus attention on ownership as
an aspect, or form, of consciousness that can come undone under
certain conditions (e.g., Klein and Nichols, 2012; Lane, 2012).
With respect to the theory of episodic memory I have proposed,
these studies potentially constitute a small data-base (I suspect
additional cases will appear in the literature if dysfunction of con-
tent ownership becomes a recognized issue in memory research)
that, once assembled, will permit investigators to empirically test
the effects of “loss of ownership” on memorial experience.
Fourth, as things currently stand, my theory also submits
to empirical testing with non-impaired participants. Here I
outline one such study (others will be discussed in a forthcoming
paper). Assuming it possible to simultaneously achieve a high
degree of temporal and spatial resolution using various brain
scanning technologies (e.g., EEG, fMRI, and PET) it should be
feasible to track both the chronology and localization of neural
activity during performance of a “remember/know” task. If
temporal resolution is sufficiently sensitive, and the constructs
in play sufficiently well defined (note: “sufficiently” may require
technological and conceptual refinement), it would allow us
to examine the stages of memory (i.e., encoding, storage, and
retrieval) activated during the process of declarative remem-
bering. Anatomical localization—in conjunction with “stage”
information provided by temporal data—would enable us to
bring to focus the systems responsible for storage (which are, of
logical necessity, causally prior to retrieval) followed by those
involved in retrieval. If my model has merit, the activation of
stored content during performance of the remember/know task
will evidence comparable localization(s) regardless of whether
the participant’s phenomenological report turns out to be
“remember” or “know.” Neural separation, by contrast, should
be evidenced during the retrieval phase (due to differences in
the mechanisms mediating remember/know judgments—i.e.,
inference vs. autonoetic awareness).
Finally, the notion that single case studies have serious lim-
itations with regard to theory construction is far from agreed
on. In fact, Caramazza (1986, 1991) and Sokol et al. (1991)
have argued persuasively for the importance of N = 1 studies in
the development of neuropsychological models. Of course, not
everyone shares this view: Some feel that theory construction
requires inference from group performance (e.g., Shallice, 1988;
Robertson et al., 1993). However, since there are no “knockdown”
arguments favoring one view to the exclusion of the other, there is,
at present, no logically compelling reason for conceptual closure.
The theory presented herein also offers a potential correc-
tive on research practices that may be doing more to cloud
than to illuminate the role of long-term memory in various
task performances. A central idea of this paper is the episodic
and semantic memories are distinguished not by their content,
but rather by the way that content is phenomenologically given:
The features of “episodic content” are not, in principle, dis-
tinguishable from those of “semantic content.” This calls into
serious question the advisability of studies attempting to docu-
ment the workings of a particular type of declarative memory via
analysis of reported remembered content. To take one example
(and there are a multitude), a recent paper by Rasmussen and
Bernsten (2012) attempts to document the episodic contributions
to future-oriented thought by examining the relative proportions
of episodic and semantic content present in participants’ mem-
ory transcripts. Such an attempt, on present considerations, is
misguided since there is no principled way in which a researcher
can classify content as episodic or semantic; the episodic and
semantic designationors refer to the manner in which content is
experienced at retrieval.
FINAL THOUGHTS
The present emendation of the episodic/semantic memory dis-
tinction awaits the considerable work of empirical conformation
and theoretical accommodation. However, despite its provisional
status, it has the merit of (1) being consistent with real-world data
from case studies (e.g., R. B., and D. B.), (2) helping bring some
order to the debate over whether episodic and semantic memory
are best construed as functionally independent neural systems, or
rather two ways scientists (though not necessarily nature) have
chosen to divide up declarative memory, (3) helping make sense
of impairments in mental time travel (both into the past and
future; for discussion, see Klein, 2013a), (4) accommodating a
number of findings (e.g., the differential bases for, and forms of,
episodic amnesia, memory errors, and performance on implicit
memory tasks), and (5) having considerations of parsimony (both
logical and evolutionary) on its side.
The decoupling of autonoetic awareness and memory
content—revealed most clearly by the case of R. B. (see also the
case of patient D. B)—can be taken as an “existence proof” for
the proposition that the connection between autonoetic aware-
ness and episodic memory is one of contingency rather than one
of necessity. That is, R. B.’s memory phenomenology suggests that
awareness is not an intrinsic property of episodic content; rather,
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the association between content and awareness may best be con-
strued as a relation between two functionally independent systems
that jointly contribute to the experience of episodic recollection.
Perhaps ironically, Hermann Ebbinghaus, a name typically
associated with an approach to memory now discredited as
being overly-influenced by logical positivism (e.g., Bartlett, 1932;
Danziger, 2008), seems to have intuited (though not explored)
the need to invoke acts of consciousness to explain memory phe-
nomenology. In the introductory remarks in his book Memory,
Ebbinghaus makes the following observation: “. . . in the majority
of cases we at once recognize the returned mental state as one
that has already been experienced; that is, we remember it. Under
certain conditions, however, this accompanying consciousness is
lacking and we know only indirectly that ‘now’ must be iden-
tical with ‘then’. . . ” (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913, p. 2; emphasis
mine). Put in terms of the model proposed in the present paper,
Ebbinghaus is calling attention to the need to posit an autonoetic-
like form of consciousness that acts on retrieved memory con-
tent to provide the experience of pastness as directly given
(i.e., episodic) rather than indirectly inferred (i.e., semantic).
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